Semper Liberi

Thursday, February 23, 2006

Wednesday's Opinions

Without further delay, an overview of the opinions that came out yesterday.

The most important ruling in terms of criminal law implications was Oregon v. Guzek. Per Justice Breyer, the Court concluded that a defendant does not have a Sixth Amendment right to re-introduce alibi testimony in sentencing proceedings in an attempt to show, in spite of the previous conviction at trial, that he is actually innocent. The majority opinion stated, inter alia, that the Court has never recognized a general right to introduce evidence of innocence at post-conviction sentencing proceedings. In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, wanted the Court to go further and directly say that there is no such constitutional right.

In the category of civil procedure, in Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp. the Court dealt with a case involving a Title VII sexual harassment claim against an employer with fewer than 15 employees (by its language, Title VII only applies to employers with 15 or more employees). The Court, in a unanimous opinion by Justice Ginsburg, concluded that the 15 employee cutoff is a substantive element of the cause of action, not a rule of federal subject-matter jurisdiction. The distinction was important because while subject-matter defects can be raised at any time, failures of substantive law, under Rule 12(b)(6), must be raised before the end of trial. In the Arbaugh case, the defendant raised the defect for the first time after trial. Surprisingly, the Court promulgated what might actually be a bright line rule:

If the Legislature clearly states that a threshold limitation on a statute's scope shall count as jurisdictional, then courts and litigants will be duly instructed and will not be left to wrestle with the issue. See Da Silva, 229 F. 3d, at 361 (Whether a disputed matter concerns jurisdiction or the merits (or occasionally both) is sometimes a close question.). But when Congress does not rank a statutory limitation on coverage as jurisdictional, courts should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional in character. Applying that readily administrable
bright line to this case, we hold that the threshold number of employees for application of Title VII is an element of a plaintiff's claim for relief, not a jurisdictional issue.


A nice case to read for any other jurisdiction junkies out there.

In a funny case involving sovereign immunity and the delivery of mail, the Court ruled in Dolan v. Postal Service that the Post Office can be sued where the negligent delivery of letters causes a slip-and-fall accident. The Federal Tort Claims Act abrogates federal sovereign immunity for many torts committed by federal agents, but the FTCA contains an exception preserving immunity for the "loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of letters or postal matter." Looking to the purpose of the FTCA and similar exceptions, Justice Kennedy (writing for a seven member majority) found that this preservation of immunity does not apply to slip-fall situations caused by mail delivery. Justice Thomas dissented.

In its fourth and final opinion of the day, Domino's Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, an again unanimous court (per Justice Scalia) held, not surprisingly, that only plaintiffs who would have had contractual rights can sue under 42 U.S.C. 1981, which prohibits racial discrimination in the "making and enforcing" of contracts. Also not surprisingly, the decision reversed a Ninth Circuit ruling to the contrary.

Justice Alito did not take part in deciding any of the cases.

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