New SCOTUS Opinions (Huzzah!)

After its usual early-February hiatus, the Court resumed its public schedule on an active note. On the same day that the Court heard arguments on the wetlands issue and granted cert. in the partial-birth abortion cases, it issued five new opinions. Three of today's decisions are per curiam opinions (meaning that they carry no formal precedential value), including a ruling discussing the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

The Court issued two actual, precedential, signed opinions. In Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, the Court ruled that in cases involving the validity of contracts with an arbitration provision, a defendant must raise the defense of illegality with the arbitrator and cannot file a claim in court to void the contract on that ground. Justice Thomas dissented, repeating his contention that the provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act do not apply to state court proceedings.

In the longer and more interesting opinion, Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente União do Vegetal, Chief Justice Roberts, writing for unanimous court, concluded that the federal government cannot bar a small Christian sect's use of hallucinogenic tea under federal drug laws. The case is interesting primarily because it involved application of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993. To quote the opinion's syllabus:

Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) in response to Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U. S. 872, where, in upholding a generally applicable law that burdened the sacramental use of peyote, this Court held that the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause does not require judges to engage in a case-by-case assessment of the religious burdens imposed by facially constitutional laws, id., at 883–890. Among other things, RFRA prohibits the Federal Government from substantially burdening a person’s exercise of religion, “even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability,” 42 U. S. C. §2000bb–1(a), except when the Government can “demonstrat[e] that application of the burden to the person (1) [furthers] a compelling government interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering
that . . . interest,” §2000bb–1(b).

The Court concluded that the sect's use of the tea posed no signifigant threat to the enforcement of federal drug laws.

Update: Should have metioned that Justice Alito took no part in deciding any of these cases, as he was not on the bench when they were argued.