Monday, December 10, 2007
An Ending (Probably) and A New Beginning
Along with a few others, I started this blog largely to provide a forum for the members of the Federalist Society chapter at the West Virginia University College of Law. Now, the original bloggers have graduated (yes, including me), and, as far as I can tell, the WVU Federalist Society chapter has pretty much disbanded since we left. Hopefully, the WVU chapter will reform shortly, but there is no prospect (right now) that any group of WV Fed Soc members will make use of this site in the near future. Thus, I'm making what was a de facto ending official: no further posts on this blog are planned.
Why am I posting this now, when it is quite possible that, the former contributors and readers having left long ago, no one else will actually read it? Because, in my view, the work we did here merits some sort of ending. As I read through the postings on this blog, I was first struck by disappointment as I recalled how things ground to a halt in 2006. But as I read on, moving to earlier posts, feelings of pride and memories of meaningful discussions surfaced. There is good work here from a number of people; more than a few things here bear re-reading. And in the typically speak-before-you-think blogosphere I think that's not nothing.
As for me, I'm starting a new, personal blog, tentatively called LPMN ("Law, Politics, and Miscellaneous Nonsense"). Among other things, I'll be discussing my views on current legal news events and starting to offer, tentatively and clumsily, some more systematically put-together thoughts about legal theory in a constitutional system.
As for this blog, it will be dormant until further notice (which will probably never come). But the archive will remain online. Indeed, at LPMN I'm sure that I will freely link back to various posts from here. But it's about time that Semper Liberi got a finish. Thanks to all who contributed, commented, and read (and to anyone who is reading now), and if you've got a few minutes to kill give the archives a scan. I bet you'll find it worth the time.
Best,
Brian Areford
Tuesday, September 05, 2006
A Remarkable Op-Ed
In a rare opinion piece by a sitting federal judge, J. Harvie Wilkinson writes against attempts to ban same-sex marriage by constitutional amendment in today's Washington Post. The piece is remarkable not simply because of Wilkinson's status as one of the nation's most pre-eminent judges not on the Supreme Court, but because he raises arguments against marriage amendments from a judicially "conservative" prospective and directs them at those who hold similar beliefs about judicial power (ie. people like most of those in the Fed Soc). Without going too deep into Wilkinson's argumentation -you simply, absolutely must read the whole thing- here's a taste:
Judges began the rush to constitutionalize. The Massachusetts Supreme Court concocted a state constitutional right to marry persons of the same sex. The court went on to say that opposing views lacked so much as a rational basis. In other words, centuries of common-law tradition, legislative sanction and human experience with marriage as a bond between one man and one woman were deemed by that court unworthy to the point of irrationality.
It would be altogether understandable for Congress and state legislatures to counter this constitutional excess with constitutional responses of their own. Yet it would be the wrong thing to do.
The Framers meant our Constitution to establish a structure of government and to provide individuals certain inalienable rights against the state. They certainly did not envision our Constitution as a place to restrict rights or enact public policies, as the Federal Marriage Amendment does.
I won't make any comments on Wilkinson's piece at this point; it deserves some more time for processing and reflection. On the other hand, you should stop reading this right now and go read Judge Wilkinson's article. More later...
Thursday, August 24, 2006
Just So
Long before the concept of a living Constitution was hatched, the authors of the original version — as well as the courts interpreting it — understood that the executive branch has the authority and flexibility to conduct foreign policy and wage war. Terrorists may be criminals, but they aren’t merely criminals. They’re waging war against us and doing so in ways never imagined by the founders. They don’t want territory or treaties, and they don’t use armies and cannons. They want to make our own technology and freedoms into weapons they can use against us.
And so here is the real absurdity of the “living Constitution” school. Where the Constitution is supposed to be inert, they want it alive and mutating. But where the Constitution was intended to be flexible, complete intellectual rigor mortis has set in.
Tuesday, August 22, 2006
We're Back...
Its been an interesting, stimulating, and ... eventful summer, but for better and for worse we're back to school here at the good old College of Law. One of the "better" implications of that formulation, hopefully, is the resurrection of this blog.
Right now, Semper Liberi has both a lot to cover and not much to cover. There are still a lot of cases from last year's SCOTUS term that this blog hasn't covered yet and which certainly deserve coverage (Hamdan not least among them, of course). And, as always, there's tons of great scholarly material and commentary floating around out there that merits attention here. However, until the first Monday in October rolls around there will probably be fairly few legal events that will require immediate discussion, at least for the purposes of this blog. That should allow some time for the commentators (read mostly, but hopefully not exclusively, me) to catch up somewhat.
The bottom line regarding the blog, I suppose, is that we'll see how it goes as it goes. Thanks for your patience and readership.
Brian
P.S.
I also have to extend a special thanks to all those who wished me well during the "unpleasantness" of the spring / first half of summer. Fortunately, I have good reason to think that those matters are now permanently in the past . Getting back to the practice and (now) the study of law has been the -aside from the above mentioned expressions of concern- the best medicine.
Monday, July 03, 2006
A Mid-Summer Status Update
That this period of inactivity has coincided with the year-end opinion surge from the first year of the Roberts Court has, of course, not escaped my attention. It also does not escape my attention that a law blog that does not address such decisions on a timely basis is basically worthless. I have no defense to offer on that front.
Tuesday, May 23, 2006
A Rather Sad Objection
House Speaker J. Dennis Hastert (R-Ill.) expressed alarm at the raid. "The actions of the Justice Department in seeking and executing this warrant raise important Constitutional issues that go well beyond the specifics of this case," he said in a lengthy statement released last night.
Well, ok, so maybe they're not immediately outraged about the same things that people outside Congress are ( House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi and Senate Leader Bill Frist have expressed similar sentiments). The "constitutional issues" that Hastert refers to supposedly stem from the "speech and debate" clause in Article I, Section 6:
They [senators and representatives] shall in all cases, except treason, felony and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other place.
Of course, the text on its face refers only to arrests, and makes no reference to investigations or the execution of search warrants unrelated to a representative's "speech and debate". Moreover, even in the realm of arrests the exception for "treason, felony, and breach of the peace" has been interpreted very broadly, to encompass virtually all modern crimes (see this annotation from the Cornell Legal Information Institute). As former assistant attorney general Viet Dinh explains in the article, "the raid on [Jefferson's] offices itself does not define a constitutional issue."
If I were Hastert, Pelosi, or Frist, I would be more worried about whether my members were selling their offices, and the electoral consequences of that discovery, than trying to stigmatize the FBI for aggressively investigating corruption.
Sunday, May 21, 2006
The Post's New Law Blog
And even if the amendment somehow miraculously passed through Congress and the states it is not at all clear that such a change to the Constitution would survive a court challenge, even with a solidly conservative Supreme Court in charge. There is a reason that smart judges around the country have had problems with same-sex marriage bans. They are not always and on their face legal.
Here's a quick refresher on Con Law: if a proposed amendment gets passed by 2/3's of each house of Congress and 3/4's of the states, it becomes part of the Constitution. Period. The amendment could institute limburger as the national cheese, to be consumed at all official functions, and it would still be a valid amendment. The "judges" the Post's blogger refers to are some who have addressed various proposed amendments to various state constitutions, which often have somewhat less straightforward (if also often less onerous) methods of amendment.
I normally dislike those who take potshots at other sites, and try to refrain from doing so myself, but the Post's blog is simply filled with shoddy and silly pieces of legal analysis like the one quoted above. The Post is and remains an excellent source for legal news, but their new law opinion blog is an embarrassment.
Friday, May 19, 2006
Alito's First Big Decision
As those who have taken crim. pro. certainly know, the Court has held that the Fourth Amendment requires searches to be "reasonable" not only in the standard of suspicious needed to justify a search (usually probable cause), by warrant or otherwise, but also must reasonable in execution. In the context of the execution of search warrants in private homes, the Court has in the recent past adopted the knock-and-announce rule as a presumed requirement for reasonable execution. In brief, the rule requires that police knock, announce their identity and the fact that they have a warrant, and give the occupants a reasonable period of time to answer the door before entering the premises. Police can forgo the requirement if, essentially, they have good reason to do so. Hudson involves a situation where the police, without good reason, knocked and announced their presence but forced entry into a house immediately after. The police found drugs in the pocket of one of those in the house.
Michigan has essentially conceded that the knock-and-announce rule was violated. But the state argued before the Court that the exclusionary rule should not apply to such violations. Not all violations of the Fourth Amendment trigger the exclusionary rule, and Michigan contends that applying exclusion in cases like Hudson is not necessary or justifiable to deter knock-and-announce omissions. The first argument in the case occurred while Justice O'Connor was still on the Court, and the fact that it is being reargued suggests that the other justices are split 4-4.
Enter Justice Alito. If Alito votes against exclusion, it will represent a continuing trend of the Court moving away from application of the rule for what might be considered especially technical, almost de minimis breaches of the Fourth Amendment. Of course, there are those of the opposite view, including the ACLU and (somewhat interestingly) the Cato institute. An AP story is here.
Monday, May 15, 2006
When Belief Overwhelms Judgment
The problem was that Coleman was, in fact, guilty. Earlier this year, the test came back as a definitive match.
The Post article provides some excellent insights into the motives of Coleman's defenders. The most glaring question is why so many believed in his innocence even in the face of the powerful (pre-DNA) physicial evidence of his guilt presented at his 1981 trial and continued to believe when less-sophisticated DNA tests, conducted in the 1990's, implicated him in the crime. As one might suspect, none of those involved directly state that their opposition to the death penalty may have affected their judgment about Coleman's guilt, but one doesn't have to do much reading between the lines to come to that conclusion.
I don't intend this post as a comment on the merits of the death penalty (one way or another). But more generally taken I think the story provides a cautionary tale of what can happen when lawyerly judgment is subsumed by "quests for justice" insufficiently checked by reason or concern for fact.
Thursday, May 11, 2006
Judge Luttig
Of course, the Post's explanations could well be wrong; no one except Luttig can be certain about his reasons. In any event, Judge Luttig (pronounced "loo-tig") was an important intellectual force in the judiciary and a fine judge generally. His retirement is a significant loss to the Fourth Circuit, and those of us who hold Federalist Society-type beliefs should hope that will he continue to produce legal scholarship at a significant pace.
An Update on the Blog's Status and Future
With the onset of summer, it is my expectation that I (and hopefully some other members of our group) will have the time and willingness to post more frequently. Speaking for myself, I hope to gradually catch up on my reviews of the Court's slip opinions, as well as continuing to occasionally post about whatever legal issues happen to catch my interest. In the longer term, I have some more ambitious ideas for the blog that may or may not get implemented, depending on how time issues play out.
While the salad days of three or four posts a day are probably gone for good, Semper Liberi will continue its mission of providing discussion and analysis of important legal issues of the day, as well as whatever else peaks our legal interest, at a more sustainable pace. Keep reading, and remember our supercilious latin motto: audi alteram partem.
Friday, March 24, 2006
Back, With A Familiar Issue
Monday, March 20, 2006
Work, Work, Work...
Update: Still engrossed in trial preparation. Unfortunately, no further updates likely until Wednesday night.
Saturday, March 18, 2006
Desperately Trying to Split Hairs in FAIR
Friday, March 17, 2006
Developments in the Moussaoui case
On a related point, there's a note of explanation that hasn't been provided by most media outlets covering the story but that's vital to understanding the trial. The government's theory is that Moussaoui pretended to cooperate with FBI agents after his arrest but actually misdirected them away from the 9/11 attacker's plan. The government argues that if Moussaoui had revealed the real plot, aviation authorities could have increased security and likely prevented at least one of the hijackings. Thus, the U.S. must present aviation security testimony about what would have been done if authorities had been warned in order to have any chance of getting a death sentence for Moussaoui. Ms. Martin's misconduct with some of those witnesses placed the whole trial in jeopardy.
Tuesday, March 14, 2006
Bad News in the Moussaoui Sentencing Trial
The latest government transgression occurred when a prosecutor improperly coached witnesses from the Federal Aviation administration. In spite of a ban on communicating with witnesses imposed by U.S. District Judge Leonie Brinkema, prosecutor Carla J. Martin e-mailed them preparatory comments and parts of the trial transcript (those comments included criticisms of her fellow prosecutor's opening statement). Judge Brinkema fumed that "In all the years I have been on the bench, I have never seen such an egregious violation of a court's rule on witnesses."
That incident follows another in which the prosecution tried to make the argument that Moussaoui should be punished for invoking his right to remain silent until he could consult an attorney. As one might expect, Judge Brinkema sustained an objection to that and is considering a defense motion for a mistrial.
I think it unlikely that Judge Brinkema will dismiss the proceedings entirely or grant a mistrial, but due to the seriousness of the government's misconduct it's not out of the question. Thus, what once seemed a sure death sentence may be on the verge on turning into a historic debacle.
Monday, March 13, 2006
An Analysis of Rumsfeld v. FAIR, Part 2
3.
Again let me begin by quoting the Court, this time explaining its law on the freedom of association:
The Solomon Amendment does not violate law schools’ freedom of speech, but the First Amendment’s protection extends beyond the right to speak. We have recognized a First Amendment right to associate for the purpose of speaking, which we have termed a “right of expressive association.” See, e.g., Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U. S. 640, 644 (2000). The reason we have extended First Amendment protection in this way is clear: The right to speak is often exercised most effectively by combining one’s voice with the voices of others. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U. S. 609, 622 (1984). If the government were free to restrict individuals’ ability to join together and speak, it could essentially silence views that the First Amendment is intended to protect. Ibid.
FAIR argues that the Solomon Amendment violates law schools’ freedom of expressive association. According to FAIR, law schools’ ability to express their message that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is wrong is significantly affected by the presence of military recruiters on campus and the schools’ obligation to assist them. Relying heavily on our decision in Dale, the Court of Appeals agreed. 390 F. 3d, at 230–235.
The Court distinguished Dale (the case which allowed the boy scouts to exclude homosexual men form serving as scout leaders on the grounds of freedom of association) and a few similar cases by essentially concluding that the “association” here was de minimis:
The Solomon Amendment, however, does not similarly affect a law school’s associational rights. To comply with the statute, law schools must allow military recruiters on campus and assist them in whatever way the school chooses to assist other employers. Law schools therefore “associate” with military recruiters in the sense that they interact with them. But recruiters are not part of the law school. Recruiters are, by definition, outsiders who come onto campus for the limited purpose of trying to hire students—not to become members of the school’s expressive association. This distinction is critical. Unlike the public accommodations law in Dale, the Solomon Amendment does not force a law school “ ‘to accept members it does not desire.’” Id., at 648 (quoting Roberts, supra, at 623). …
After rejecting a similar associational rights argument that the Solomon Amendment rendered a law school membership less desirable, the Court made its take home message on the freedom of association issues clear:
The Solomon Amendment therefore does not violate a law school’s First Amendment rights. A military recruiter’s mere presence on campus does not violate a law school’s right to associate, regardless of how repugnant the law school considers the recruiter’s message.
Before this case was decided, I had thought that the law schools’ weakest argument was on the freedom of association question, and nothing in the Court’s opinion makes me think otherwise now.
4.
Finally, let me turn to the “expressive conduct” issues and the O’Brien test. In the Vietnam War-era case of U.S. v. O’Brien, the Court distinguished between traditional speech and expressive conduct. In O’Brien itself, the expressive conduct in question was burning a draft card to protest the war. The O’Brien court announced that this type of conduct was entitled to less protection that “pure” speech, and promulgated a four-part test for evaluating the constitutionality of restrictions on that conduct.
The O’Brien test has been much and deservedly criticized for reasons which I need not go into here, and has never actually been applied to strike down a regulation on speech (which is one reason I’m not setting out the actual test here). Indeed, the Court has said that expressive conduct that is “inherently expressive” falls outside of O’Brien analysis and is entitled to the same degree of protection as more traditional forms of speech (See Johnson v. Texas, which accorded burning the U.S. flag normal protection because such conduct is inherently expressive.)
The Court’s discussion of O’Brien analysis is the weakest part of the opinion and is somewhat confused, which is not surprising given that all of the Court’s O’Brien case law is a bit confused. For the sake of completeness, however, let me quote what I take as the Court’s main point:
Unlike flag burning, the conduct regulated by the Solomon Amendment is not inherently expressive. Prior to the adoption of the Solomon Amendment’s equal-access requirement, law schools “expressed” their disagreement with the military by treating military recruiters differently from other recruiters. But these actions were expressive only because the law schools accompanied their conduct with speech explaining it. For example, the point of requiring military interviews to be conducted on the undergraduate campus is not “overwhelmingly apparent.” Johnson, supra, at 406. An observer who sees military recruiters interviewing away from the law school has no way of knowing whether the law school is expressing its disapproval of the military, all the law school’s interview rooms are full, or the military recruiters decided for reasons of their own that they would rather interview someplace else.
I may make an additional post explaining the absurdity of the O’Brien test at some point, but for now that’s more than enough.
This post completes my overview of the Court’s opinion. I’ll be back on this topic in a while with a few more thoughts on the import of the case.
I'm Back
WASHINGTON - For all the recent tumult over abortion, one thing has remained surprisingly stable: Americans have proved extremely consistent in their beliefs about the procedure and extremely conflicted in their views.
A solid majority long have felt that Roe v. Wade should be upheld. Yet most support at least some restrictions on when abortions can be performed. Most think having an abortion should be a personal choice. But they also think it is murder.
"Rock solid in its absolutely contradictory opinions" is how public opinion expert Karlyn Bowman describes the nation's mind-set.
For our legal purposes, the main import of the article is that a majority of Americans say Roe should be upheld, but also support restrictions that would clearly be invalid under Roe. As I said, not a surprising or unprecedented finding in any way, but one worth examining from time to time.
Friday, March 10, 2006
A Brief Hiatus
Take it, dammit.
See you on Monday.
Scholarship Update
Many people know of the Alien and Sedition Acts, the John Adams era measures that basically criminalized criticism of the president. Fewer know about the controversy among scholars regarding John Marshall's possible role in advocating for the Acts. Two law professors argue that Marshall authored one of the most significant defenses of the Acts, using similar lines of reasoning to those he articulated in McCulloch v. Maryland.
Whatever happened to the crime of treason? A California prof posits an answer and argues for returning treason from dead letter law.
The line between exaggeration and fraud in sales situations can get a little blurry. The authors of "The Best Puffery Article Ever" try to clear things up a bit and make some proposals for increasing the reach of fraud law. Speaking as the Best Law Student Ever, I say the article looks to be worth a read.
A key shared assumption among most originalists is the usefulness of referring to the common law in place at the time of a constitutional provision's framing. A prof takes up the strengths and weaknesses of that technique in a paper draft.